





















































The orthodox approach to time states it to be a contin-
uum. In this paper I aim to show that the growing block 
model poses a unique problem to the continuity of time, 
on account of it being a hybrid A-B-theory. Tension lies 
in the fact that a continuous B-theoretical block is built 
through the A-theoretical becoming of instantaneous 
slices of present. First, I show that a continuous grow-
ing block necessitates a present with zero temporal 
duration; second, I show that such notion of present 
rules out some widely accepted B-theoretical solutions 
to the problem of the continuum, while its commitment 
to the B-theory rules out some of the A-theoretical ones. 
Finally, I will discuss possible consequences.
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The standard conception is that time and space are continuous. Since time is com-
monly considered structurally similar to a one-dimensional space, the time continu-
um is often portrayed as the Euclidian straight geometrical line. Just as the straight 
line is made up of extensionless points, the time continuum is taken to be construct-
ed of point-like durationless instants. The continuum is gap free: it persists without 
any breaks or interruption; it is dense: between each two point there is always anoth-
er point; and it is infinitely and indefinitely divisible: any division of the continuum will 
always result in parts that can in turn be further divided, without ever resulting in 
indivisibles (Bell 2019, viii). These properties of the continuum on the one hand, and 
its being constituted by points on the other, raise challenges that were the subject of 
a long lasting philosophical and mathematical inquiry. The tension increases when it 
comes to time.
A geometrical line is not a full description of the ordinary (common-sense) 
notion of time, since it lacks two important unique features. The first is that time 
does not only have an order, it also has a preferred direction: it runs from earlier to 
later. The temporal series that runs from earlier to later is known as the B-series, and 
the relations between its terms will be referred to as B-relations. The second feature 
of time is that it appears to involve some sort of flow or change. It seems as if every 
instant in time changes from being future, to being present, to being further and fur-
ther in the past. The series whose terms are past, present, and future is called the 
A-series (McTaggart 1908).
B-theories of time embrace the B-series and reject the objectivity of the 
A-series. They entail a space-like time and a metaphysical picture of the universe as 
a static four-dimensional spacetime block. Such views are compatible with the cur-
rently accepted Cantorian account of continuity. A-theories argue that the A-series 
is objective and things in time do change in respect to its terms. A-theories entail a 
dynamic metaphysical view and are therefore more inclined to embrace different ac-
counts of continuity. Finally, the growing block view is a hybrid of the two. It is com-
mitted both to the view of the universe as a four-dimensional spacetime block that 
is eternally fixed in B-relations, and to the claim that there are objectively distinct 
A-categories, in respect to which time changes.
According to the growing block theory, the change of time itself cannot be 
put in the same terms as change in things in respect to time. An illustration of the lat-
ter is the change Tom Smith undergoes as he grows taller than his father John. There 
is a time t in which the son is shorter than his father and a time t’ in which he is taller 
than his father. The change of things in time is relative to time. The change of a mo-
ment in time is different, and can be compared to the change Tom Smith undergoes 
as a new child is born into the family. If Tom is John’s youngest son, he will remain 
so until the birth of a new sibling. Afterwards, Tom will no longer be John’s young-
est son. A change has occurred, yet Tom himself did not undergo any intrinsic change. 
What changed is the fact that a new entity came into being, thus forming new rela-
tions with the pre-existing members of the family. Such is the change of time. Three-
dimensional slices of reality keep coming into existence, joining the world history 
one by one, thus forming a four-dimensional growing block. The future does not ex-
ist. The present is the most recent slice that came into being, and once another slice 
is added, it becomes the new present and the precedent slice becomes past. This pro-
cess is called becoming (Broad 1923, 65-68).
































































seemingly impossible to resolve, as the block grows through the becoming of three-di-
mensional slices with zero temporal extension. Or if we think of time as a straight 
line, time in the growing block universe literally is formed through the accumulation 
of point-like instants. In the following section I show that the present slice cannot 
have any non-zero temporal extension, and that the block can only grow through the 
becoming of one such durationless slice at a time. In the third section I lay out some 
of the problems the point-like present brings about and their accepted solution. I then 
show why they do not apply to the growing block. In the final section I discuss possi-
ble consequences and conclusions.
II. The Growing Block and the Problem of the Extended Present
When holding to a continuous growing block view, a point-like present is inevitable. 
The only intelligible option for the growing block theorist is to admit that the tempo-
ral dimension of the block is constructed through the addition of present slices un-
der two restrictions: (a) the present cannot have any non-zero temporal extension; 
and (b) the growth of the block can only occur through the becoming of one such in-
stantaneous slice of reality at a time. These restrictions are a direct consequence of 
two pillar notions of the growing block theory. The first is the very definition of the 
A-categories in the model, which entails that the present moment cannot have any 
non-zero duration; the second pertains to the forming of the B-relations through the 
process of becoming, which cannot possibly allow for any duration of time greater 
than zero to become all at once.
II.1. The Problem of the Defining Features of the Present
The A-theoretical commitments of the growing block entail an objective present mo-
ment that is distinct from the two other temporal categories, the past and future. 
This distinction is derived from what Miller calls «the growing block ontological the-
sis»; namely, that the past and the present exist, while the future is a non-existence 
(Miller 2013, 348). The present moment is topologically distinct from the rest of the 
block by virtue of being the only slice of existence that has no successor: «the es-
sence of a present event is not that it precedes future events, but that there is quite 
literally nothing to which it has the relation of precedence» (Broad 1923, 66). But 
this is not the full picture; the growing block’s A-theoretical commitments also in-
clude what Miller calls «the dynamic thesis», according to which the answer to the 
question about which moment is the present is ever-changing (Miller 2013, 348). This 
change is possible due to the process of becoming; namely, the coming into existence 
of one temporal slice at a time. As a new slice comes into existence on the edge of re-
ality, the slice that was once present becomes the past and goes deeper into the past 
as more slices accumulate one by one in a gradual process. The process of becoming 
entails not only the ordering relation of earlier and later than, or succession – it also 
entails enumeration, or consecutiveness, meaning the instantiation of the temporal 
particulars one by one and therefore one before the others (Craig 2000, 234-235). 
Hence the very definition of the present in the growing block consists of two distinct 
features: one, it has no successors; and two, it is not just the last temporal slice in the 
ordered, directed block, but is also the latest addition to reality. But these two defin-
ing features of the present cannot be consistent with the notion of extended present.
Let us assume a continuous growing block in which the present has du-
































































even if very small. For convenience, consider such an extended temporal slice as a 
temporal interval on the growing block. Any such temporal interval of the grow-
ing block would then have to be indefinitely divisible into smaller temporal intervals 
that in turn are also indefinitely divisible. Since those sub-intervals are all parts of 
the latest addition to reality, each of them would also be considered a present slice. 
As a result we will end up with an entity that is contradictory by its very definition: 
a “present” slice that has one or more successors. And since one of the properties of 
a continuous interval is being indefinitely divisible, any such “present” slice could al-
ways have infinitely many successors, and no amount of division will ever lead to a 
single present slice that has no successors.
A possible objection might be that while this line of argument might en-
force restriction (a), it does not necessarily imply that restriction (b) has to hold as 
well. Indeed, the objectors could say that it is easy to see why the present has to be 
point-like, but then ask: must the block grow through the becoming of one duration-
less slice at a time? In line with this objection, some might try to reconcile the conflict 
between the extension of the temporal slices and the defining features of the grow-
ing block’s present by appealing to what Forbes calls «past genesis» (Forbes 2015, 
191). In the context of the growing block, past genesis refers to things in time com-
ing into existence directly as past, without having been present first. If the present is 
the edge of reality and the past is merely anything that precedes the present – the 
supporters of past genesis might say – there is no reason why the block should not 
grow in extended temporal intervals made mostly of past with one unique present 
end-point; namely, the boundary between this new temporal interval and nothing-
ness. Thus, the proponents of past genesis attempt to hold on to the defining features 
of the present, while avoiding the problems of the point-like present and the continu-
um (to be discussed in section III). It might seem tempting to turn to past genesis as a 
reply to the objections the problems of the continuum may give raise to, but there are 
good reasons not to. For one, it strengthens another objection to the growing block 
known as the epistemic problem.
The epistemic problem, also known as «the present problem» (Bourne 
2002) or «the now-now problem» (Braddon-Mitchell 2004) might be summarised 
as follows: we believe that our time is the present, but granted a growing block met-
aphysic, we are much likelier to be in the past. If we embrace (a) but not (b), not only 
do we have no way of knowing whether our time is the true present, but the hope 
that we ever were truly in the present is faint. Past genesis also weakens the dead 
past growing block: a variety of the growing block that was conceived in response to 
the now-now problem. (Forrest 2004, Forbes 2016) According to dead past growing 
blockers, we can know with certainty that we are in the present moment, since only 
this very instant can sustain activity or processes and consciousness. The misfortune 
of the past that was born dead is more than just grim; past genesis disqualifies the 
dead past growing block’s line of defence against the epistemic objection, as well as 
against the problem of past truth-makers, in particular the resolution to the problem 
suggested by Forbes (2016), that relies on the fact that things in the past used to be 
present.
Setting aside the epistemic objection and the dead past solution, there is a 
straightforward, conclusive way to prove past genesis to be impossible in a grow-
ing block universe, as past genesis ignores the second feature of the growing block’s 
present; it is not only the last moment, but also the latest. This will become clearer in 
































































II.2. The Problem of Consecutiveness in Becoming and the Forming 
of B-Relations
As proponents of the A-theory observed, the process of becoming involves not only 
succession, i.e., the B-relations of earlier than and later than, but also enumeration, or 
consecutiveness, meaning the instantiation of the temporal particulars one by one 
and therefore one before the other (Craig 2000, 234-235). In the growing block view, 
the notions of temporal succession and consecutiveness are intimately connected. 
The succession of temporal slices depends on the consecutiveness of their becoming, 
which makes it impossible for a single temporal slice to have internal succession. Like 
the B-theories, the growing block is committed to the thesis that everything that ex-
ists in time does so in eternally fixed B-relations. Different B-theorists may employ 
different strategies to account for the order and direction of the time series. Some 
will take them to be primitive; others, as the result of asymmetries in the contents 
of time or in our consciousness, rather than features of time itself. But the growing 
block also adheres to the commitment that the temporal order and direction of the 
block are not arbitrary or illusory; rather they are objective features of time itself. It is 
widely held that in contrast with a static B-theory, objective temporal becoming has 
the ability to account for temporal direction (Craig 2000, 256-258), and the growing 
block makes use of this notion of becoming for this very purpose.
In other words, very much like in McTaggart’s original argument, in the 
growing block model, the B-series stems from the A-series. When a new slice of real-
ity is added through becoming, new relations between this slice and the sum total of 
reality come into existence that did not and could not have existed before, since be-
fore it came into being that slice was nothing at all (Broad 1923, 66). That includes the 
relations of temporal succession. To put it more simply, the fact that slice S at time 
t is later than slice S’ at time t’ is the direct consequence of S’ coming into existence 
after S already existed.
It now becomes clear that the growing block does not allow for the pres-
ent to have any non-zero duration. The B-relations of earlier than and later than in 
the growing block are formed through becoming. As a temporal slice comes into ex-
istence through the process of becoming, it concurrently becomes the immediate 
successor of the slice that was formerly the edge of being. Thus, any amount of ex-
istence that joins the universe through a single act of becoming can only be simulta-
neous in respect to the temporal dimension, which means all of the content of such 
a slice necessarily occupies a single temporal location in the B-series. Obviously, for 
anything in the spatiotemporal block to have duration – whether we refer to it as an 
event, a temporal slice or an interval of time is immaterial – it would have had to be 
spread across several B-locations, and there would have had to be a distinction be-
tween its earlier and later parts. But as previously shown, anything that comes into 
being together is B-simultaneous, and therefore cannot be divided into distinguish-
able, successive parts. The contents of each new slice are always simultaneous and 
therefore it takes more than one slice to form a temporal segment whose duration is 
greater than zero; whenever there is more than one slice, it means their becoming oc-
curred consecutively, or else they would have been one and the same slice and there-
fore have a single B-location and zero duration. Thus, there can only be one new du-
rationless slice at a time, and only one such slice can be the latest addition to reality. 
The derivation of succession from consecutiveness renders both the extended pres-
































































III. The Point-Like Present and the Continuum
In this section I will explore two ways in which the point-like present may pose a 
challenge to the time continuum in the growing block model; the first is the prob-
lem famously known as Zeno’s paradox of plurality: how can durationless slices add 
up and form temporal duration (zero times infinity still equals zero); and the second 
is that one of the properties of the continuum is density, yet it is unclear whether a 
growing block metaphysics allows for the time series to be dense.
III.1. The Problem with Point-Like Presents Forming Duration
The fact that the growing block builds through the accumulation of durationless slic-
es poses a twofold problem. On the one hand there is the problem of addition; clear-
ly the block itself has temporal duration, but it consists of individual slices that have 
zero duration, and even infinitely many such slices could never amount to any du-
ration greater than zero. On the other hand there is the problem of temporal loca-
tions; the present slice lies at the very edge of the block, and when a new slice is add-
ed through becoming, it must also come to be exactly on the very edge of the block, 
or else the block could not be gap-free. In that case, how can B-locations be distin-
guished one from the other? Let the edge of reality be in time tn. As long as the slices 
are actualized on that very location, there can be no further locations; in order for the 
location tn+1 to come into existence, a temporal interval from tn to tn+1 will have to be-
come all at once, which I showed to be impossible on the growing block. This applies 
equally to any number between n and n+1, no matter how small. Given that the pres-
ent is point-like, the temporal location of each and every new slice would be the same 
as of its predecessor, and consequently, as of the entire block.
The solutions I am about to discuss in this section have one thing in com-
mon: they discredit the underlying assumption that the length of an interval on a line 
is generated by adding up the lengths of its smallest continuants. Looking back to the 
growing block account previously given, it becomes evident why proponents of the 
model might want to hold on to such an assumption.
The first solution is to view the line as prior to the points. This approach was 
first introduced in Aristotle’s discussion of Zeno’s paradoxes and later embraced by 
Brentano, Peirce and others. (Bell 2019, 157, 163). Continuous magnitudes are poten-
tially divisible to infinity in the sense that they may be divided anywhere, though they 
cannot be divided everywhere at the same time. Aristotle’s argument is as follows: 
first, since points have no parts, they cannot form a continuum, and second, the con-
tinuum is prior to its parts and points exist not in actuality, but as limits of lines (Phy. 
231a21-b10). The continuum has the potential to be infinitely divided, not into points, 
but into segments that can also be infinitely divided, and so on, and so on. The points 
are the boundaries of the segments that are the parts of the continuum, but any such 
parts only come into being as the wholes are divided.
But this cannot be said of the growing block, seeing that addition in fact oc-
curs in the process of becoming. Given a growing block metaphysics, there has to be 
such a thing as an actual instantaneous slice of time, and as I showed the block can-
not exist prior to these slices and can only grow through the becoming of such slic-
es. We cannot say that the time continuum is prior to these temporal slices, because 
nothing would have existed in time if it were not for the constant accumulation of 
these slices. Thus, if we are committed to the growing block view we must admit 
































































boundaries of its potential parts. Moreover, the problem of locations still remains as 
they cannot exist prior to the becoming of their content.
Let us move on to an approach that might allow for the instantaneous slic-
es constituting the block to be actual. Our best science takes the Cantorian approach 
to the continuum, which models the continuum after the real number line. Cantor 
was able to prove that any finite segment on the real number line – regardless of how 
short or long – contains the same number of points as any other segment on the real 
number line, and as the entire real number line. I will briefly present the Cantorian ac-
count, and then show how it resolves the paradox of plurality. Then I will show why 
the Cantorian solution cannot be applied to the growing block.
Cantor proved something that seems counter-intuitive: that there are dif-
ferent sizes of infinity. An infinite set can be either denumerable (countable) or non 
denumerable. An infinite set is denumerable if it can be ordered in such a way that 
each of its members has finitely many predecessors. An example of a denumerable 
set is the set of integers. All denumerable sets can be put in a one-to-one correspond-
ence with the set of positive integers, which is neither gap free nor dense. Cantor 
was able to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the set of integers and 
the set of rational numbers, which is dense, but not gap free. So despite the fact that 
there are more rational numbers than integers on finite segments of the same length, 
both infinite sets have the same number of members. But as Cantor proved, the set 
of real numbers cannot be put in a one-to-one correspondence with the integers. 
Furthermore, any proper subset on the real number line can be put in a one-to-one 
correspondence to any other proper subset on the real number line, and to the real 
number line itself. Hence, any segment on a continuous line, no matter how long or 
short, contains the same number of points as the entire real number line (Dainton 
2010, 277-280). Therefore, the extension of a continuous line does not depend on the 
points it consists of. In everyday life, we take the size of objects to be the sum of the 
size of their smaller parts. If a segment of the sidewalk consists of paving stones, we 
would be right to think of the segment’s length as the sum of the lengths of those 
paving stones. But since any segment on a continuous line contains the same num-
ber of points regardless of its length, we would be wrong to treat it the same way we 
treat everyday objects.
But what other ways are there to determine the length of an interval if not 
by adding up its points? One way available in mathematics is called “measure theo-
ry”. According to measure theory, an interval must contain non-denumerably infinite 
amount of points for it to have length. The length is the distance between the inter-
val’s end points. Since length is not an intrinsic feature of a set of points, the points 
themselves do not matter. The addition of a single point to an interval has no effect 
whatsoever on its length. Instead, the line must be associated with a metric or dis-
tance function (see Dainton 2010, 281-283). But if we try to apply this answer to 
the growing block, we will run into a problem. The sum total of reality at any time 
tn consists of slices S1+S2+…+Sn. Let us say the temporal duration of the universe 
as of time tn is not the sum of the duration of the temporal slices forming it (which 
has to be zero). Reality then increases through the becoming of a new slice Sn+1 at 
a the new time tn+1, which are also durationless. So how can the duration of time 
as of tn+1 be greater than the duration of time as of tn? Even if we assume that as 
of tn there already was a pre-existing four-dimensional block with temporal exten-
sion, we cannot say that the adding of Sn+1 to the block makes it grow in respect to 
its temporal duration. And if we assume there is a starting point to reality such as 
































































to measure theory, an interval must contain a non-denumerably infinite number of 
points in order for it to have measure, which leads us to the problem of density.
III.2. The Problem of Density and Becoming
Euclid defined the straight line as a length without breadth, and if the line 
is composed of points, we take that to mean that there are infinitely many 
points between every two points on the line. Namely, that instances in time 
form a dense series:
Between every two elements of a dense series there will be at least one and therefore an in-
finity of other elements; so that no element has a successor, and no element a predecessor 
(Huntington 2003, 34)
As this definition makes very clear, a consequence of density is that a member of a 
dense series cannot have an immediate successor or predecessor. This contradicts 
one of the key commitments of the growing block view. Once a temporal slice is add-
ed to the sum total of reality through becoming, it comes into relations with the rest 
of reality. These relations, once formed, are eternally fixed (Broad 1923, 69). So once 
a new slice becomes on the edge of reality, a relation of succession is formed between 
it and the previous slices. Thus, every point on the time series has one direct predeces-
sor and every single past slice has one direct successor. Once a slice’s immediate suc-
cessor comes in to being, there is no way of coming up with infinitely many slices in 
between them as density requires. In other words: between two different elements of 
the growing block time series, there can only be a finite or zero number of elements.
Once again, it is the combination of the metaphysical commitments of 
the B-theory and those of the A-theory that keeps the growing block theorist from 
achieving resolution. The fact that the B-series of time is formed through consecu-
tive A-theoretical becoming conflicts with the property of density. The B-theorist can 
still accept that the indefinite divisibility will never lead to indivisibles or that there 
are a non-denumerably infinite number of points composing the continuum. But this 
means giving up completely on any A-theoretical notions. Such a block can never be 
formed through becoming.
III.3. Pure A-Theoretical Solutions
As previously mentioned, the B-theories of time need not be threatened by the notion 
of the point-like instant, and more specifically the point-like present. B-theoretical 
time is space-like and so B-theorists are not committed either to the objectivity of the 
present moment or to its dynamicity. Thus, the B-theorists are free to embrace the 
Cantorian continuum or the notion that points are potential or ideal. So perhaps the 
answer to the growing block’s problem can be found in the A-theoretical solutions 
to the problem of the continuum. The bind is that the doctrine of the instantaneous 
present is incompatible with becoming (Craig 2000, 236). A pure A-theory is open to 
endorsing different solutions. Thinkers like Bergson, Brouwer, Wyle, and others assert 
that the numbered, mathematical notion of the continuum is not how time is in itself. 
The true nature of time is given to us by our intuition. Those who hold these views 
are free to assert that all that exists is a completely unified and indivisible duration of 
time and accept a primitive pre-metrical notion of the present. Could the proponents 
































































A-theoretical becoming cannot endorse an instantaneous present without 
raising Zeno’s paradoxes of plurality and motion. One possible solution is adhering to 
the view that there is no such thing as the present simpliciter. The answers to ques-
tion such as “what is the present time?” or “how long is the present time?” vary de-
pending on the context in which they are asked. “Present time” can mean the present 
second, the present hour or the present decade (Loizou 1986 in Craig 2000, 248). This 
allows for duration to be taken as prior to metrics.
The growing block may hold to a dynamic thesis regarding the present mo-
ment, but is also, in a way, committed to a static block; new things come to be con-
stantly, but once something enters existence, it remains unchanged (Broad 1923, 66, 
79-84). Broad declares that it is misleading to call becoming “a change” (Broad 1923, 
68), which is one reason it cannot fit with the idea expressed as Bergson’s durée 
réele, or Prior’s idea that there is no transition of instants from being future to being 
present to being past: the present time is all that exists and the change is in things, 
or as he puts it: «the basic reality is things acting» (Prior unpublished, in Craig 2000, 
246). By accepting a primitive pre-metrical notion of the present, A-theoretic meta-
physics can avoid Zeno’s paradoxes (Craig 2000, 248). But the growing block cannot 
accept such notion. Perhaps the most evident incompatibility of the growing block 
with such conceptions of temporal continuity lies in the fact that the growing block 
is committed to the claim that there is a temporal dimension along which all of the 
events in time are ordered and in respect to which reality keeps expanding. Such or-
dered homogenous space-like time is in complete opposition to these notions of du-
ration and continuity.
IV. Conclusion
I showed that in a continuous growing block universe, the present has no duration. 
This is a direct result of its being a hybrid A-B-theory. The fact that the growth of the 
block can only occur through temporal slices of zero extension conflicts with the the-
sis that time is a continuum. All the B-theoretical solutions for the problems of the 
continuum that I tested so far conflict with the A-theoretical elements of the grow-
ing block, and vice versa. But the growing block is still a very intuitively and metaphys-
ically appealing theory, so it would be beneficial to find a way to settle the problems 
of continuity. One approach is to continue looking for other accounts of continuity. 
Another is to reconceive the growing block in such a way that can transcend the con-
flicting traits. Or it could be that the growing block spacetime is inherently discrete.
IV.1. Revising the Orthodox Continuum
The Cantorian view of the continuum is not without its weaknesses, which gave rise 
to (roughly) two groups of opposing views: the hyper-dense Peircean continuum and 
taking extension as fundamental. Perhaps one of them could be a better fit for the 
growing block.
The idea underlying the hyper-dense continuum is that the continuum can-
not merely be a collection of infinitely many points. In order to genuinely form a con-
tinuum, these points must be welded together, which cannot be conceptualized using 
the analogy of the real number line, as the true continuum requires an even greater 
number of points: nothing less than the maximal possible number of points. When 
packed in this hyper-dense manner, the points lose their individual identity and be-
































































While this view was proven useful in solving some of the puzzles of the continuum 
(see Dainton 2010, 307-309), it is hard to see how hyper-density could be applied to 
the growing block view given the problem of regular density and becoming discussed 
in section III.2. Moreover, since the temporal slices come into existence one by one, it 
is hard to see how they can ever reach such maximal quantity.
Extension as fundamental is the notion that the most fundamental parts 
of the continuum have extension, no matter how small. True, the orthodox contin-
uum also has the property of being infinitely and indefinitely divisible, but it is also 
conceived as having indivisible, extensionless parts – i.e. the points that constitute a 
straight line – and it is this that the difference between the views hinges on. To take 
extension as fundamental is to abandon the idea that the points are the most fun-
damental constituents of a line. Instead, the parts of a line are lines, which are made 
of smaller lines, and so on without ever reaching a bottom level (Dainton 2010, 309-
310). Taking extension as fundamental can provide a solution to the paradox of plu-
rality, but it is incompatible with the growing block because – as I showed in section 
II – there must be such a bottom level in the form of instantaneous slices from which 
the block is constructed.
IV.2. The Growing Block Revised
In “A Reply to My Critics”, Broad himself deals with the problem of the instantane-
ous present and suggests that time could have another dimension along which slices 
can be extended. Think of things in time as ordered along a T-axis, which stands for 
ordinary time. A temporal slice shall be represented as a point t on the T-axis. But if 
we add a Θ-axis, which stands for an additional temporal dimension, the temporal 
slice would be represented by a straight line of finite extension, parallel to the Θ-axis. 
(Broad 1959, 769-772)
Recall that the problem this paper is concerned with is that the growth 
of the block cannot occur through the becoming of durationless instants, yet at 
the same time it must thus occur. On the above suggestion, the temporal slice is 
T-instantaneous, but has Θ-duration, so one might say it succeeds in being both 
instantaneous and extended. However, I do not see any way how incorporating 
Θ-duration can help the growing block overcome the problems described in section 
III. More over, while there appears to be no inconsistency on this particular account, 
accepting a second temporal dimension still seems like a slippery slope leading to in-
finite regression or circularity.
There might still be a way to loosen the clutch of some of the commitments 
by adhering to a theory of growing events, rather than growing block. Perović pro-
poses a theory of growing events that still holds to the same ontological and dynamic 
theses as the growing block. But the growing events theory departs from the grow-
ing block in that in the former, events are the most fundamental ontological constit-
uents of reality (Perović 2019, 19). So the continuous four-dimensional block is but an 
abstraction form existing events, and so are the instantaneous slices:
[…] it is not such slices with their instantaneous properties that build up the GE [growing 
events] theorist’s events; rather, events are metaphysically prior and instantaneous slices 
and their properties are abstractions from events. This is just another way of saying that 
events take some time to unfold and such temporal extendedness of an event is difficult (if 
not impossible) to recover from instantaneous temporal slices of objects and their proper-
































































On this account the universe grows, but it is a growing event rather than a growing 
block, and it consists of accumulating events, rather than slices. It appears the grow-
ing event theorist might be able to adopt a different, more A-theoretical account of 
the continuum. Perhaps this is a sacrifice worth making in order to preserve the on-
tological and dynamic theses of the growing block, because it may very well be that 
they are the source of the theory’s strong intuitive appeal, and the block and slices are 
not indispensable features, but – some might say – redundant and even disqualifying. 
On the other hand there is the worry that these two theories differ on such funda-
mental grounds, that the growing events theory is not a defence of the growing block, 
rather it replaces it. Perović also notes that in order to keep to the growing block the-
ory’s original commitment to the privileged present, a variant of the growing event 
needs to be constructed that identifies the present not with “ongoingness” but with 
the very edge of being (Perović 2019, 22) and the question remains: how can the 
growing event theorist have an “edge of existence” and still avoid the B-theoretical 
succession?
IV.3. Can the Growing Block be Discrete?
The properties of the discrete and the properties of the continuous are diametrically 
opposed. While the continuous temporal interval is indefinitely divisible, the division 
of any discrete duration of time ends in indivisible atomic quantities called chronons. 
Chronons are usually defined as a certain minimal physical quantity. Indeed, when 
considering a discrete account of the growing block, questions from the physical 
sciences arise. While some of our best science relies on the continuity of time, quan-
tum mechanics might support a discrete spacetime, and there are still some very 
promising theories, such as quantum gravity, according to which time might be dis-
crete (Dainton 2010, 300-301; Rovelli 2018, 54-56).
But it seems that the theories in question do not concur with a growing 
block metaphysic. They might entail a dynamic metaphysical picture, but one that 
could not be farther from the growing block. They do not incorporate the notion of 
objective present, or the commitment of the growing block to temporal order and 
direction. As Rovelli puts it: «Time has loosened into a network of relations that no 
longer holds together as a coherent canvas» (Rovelli 2018, 58). Reality possesses no 
fixed, objective temporal relations or direction, and «in the vast universe there is 
nothing that we can reasonably call “present”»(Rovelli 2018, 59).
On the other hand, the special theory of relativity (which supports a con-
tinuous spacetime) and the growing block are far from a perfect fit. The special theo-
ry of relativity poses a challenge to both the ontological and dynamical theses of the 
growing block, and certainly to the notion of the objective present. (Miller 2013, 352-
353). So physics gives us evidence contra the growing block, be it continuous or dis-
crete. Evidence in support of the growing block may turn up in the future (more like-
ly in the form of philosophical arguments, rather than scientific observations). In the 
meantime, there is still value in investigating other consequences of a discrete grow-
ing block picture.
A clear advantage of taking space and time as discrete is that, on this view, 
they can have a metric and they can be seen as formed of their smallest constitu-
ents. So perhaps if the growing block is discrete, there need be no tension in the fact 
that its temporal duration is constructed through the becoming of temporal slices. If 
the slices could be temporally extended, rather than instantaneous, we will be able 
































































before we can arrive at that conclusion, the arguments against the extended present 
from section II must be rejected for discrete time, or else we end up back in square 
one (or in the first singular instantaneous slice of existence, if you prefer) stepping 
right into Zeno’s paradox of plurality. But maybe by accepting the doctrine that time 
is discrete, the growing block theorist can salvage the extended present. That way, 
the duration of the entire block could be additive.
Thinking back to the defining features of the growing block’s present, as 
long as the present slice cannot be divided into further present slices, there will be 
no paradoxical entities such as “present” slices with successors, and the latest addi-
tion to reality could be an atomic slice. But what will be of our commitment to the 
B-series? Can such an account give rise to Zeno’s paradoxes of motion? Not neces-
sarily. The growth of the block is not a kind of motion and must not be mistaken for 
motion (Broad 1959, 766-767), so there is no need to explain how the block grows 
from tn to tn+1 without ever traversing infinitely many locations in between. There is 
nothing paradoxical about temporal slices just coming into existence on the edge of 
the block, as it is not the traverse of the block’s edge from one temporal location to 
the next. The slices just become and by the consecutiveness of that becoming they 
can only become on the very edge of reality. And the fact that every other type of 
change in the growing block is reducible to becoming (Broad 1923, 67) does not con-
flict with the fact that once they come into existence, the slices remain static. Any 
motion of objects across space in the growing block can be analysed in a completely 
B-theoretical way such as Russell’s “at-at” theory.
I trust that this line of thought has the readers of this paper warming up to 
the idea of the discrete growing block. But some questions still remain. What is the 
duration of the slices and how is it determined? Will they still be uniform once giv-
en duration? Perhaps the answer is that the features of the present slice entail that 
the extension of a single slice can only be as great as the extension of the smallest 
possible lapse of time: the chronon. The only thing that can be uneven is the qual-
itative difference between two slices, namely differences across the dimensions of 
space; any duration greater than a chronon is spread between more than two differ-
ent B-locations, and therefore – by the way B-locations are formed – consists of more 
than a single slice. But what keeps them from being shorter than a chronon? There 
are still voices in the discussion who doubt the whole notion of chronons, claiming it 
to be incoherent and irrelevant (see Craig 2000, 240-242). But it seems that if chron-
ons do exist, their size will be uniform and determined. In the words of Lee Smolin:
According to loop quantum gravity, space is made of discrete atoms each of which carries a 
tiny unit of volume. In contrast to ordinary geometry, a given region cannot have a volume 
which is arbitrarily big or small – instead, the volume must be one of a finite set of numbers 
(Smolin 2000a, 106 in Dainton 2010, 300).
In conclusion, as a hybrid A-B-theory the growing block poses a unique problem to 
the continuity of time. The defining features of the growing block’s present demand 
that becoming will occur through the accumulation of instantaneous temporal slices, 
which inevitably conflicts with the doctrine that time is continuous. The A-theoretical 
commitments of the block on the one hand, and its B-theoretical commitments on 
the other, rule out any possibility to resolve this tension. It seems that the answer 
might be that the growing block theory cannot hold on to all of it. Its defenders will 
have to give up either some of the theory’s commitments, or the continuity of time. 
































































block seem the most promising. The growing events theorists should be able to hold 
to the growing block’s ontological and dynamical theses, but there are still open ques-
tions: if they succeed in disposing of the B-theoretical commitments entirely, would it 
still be a growing block? And could the theory still support an objective present? If the 
growing events theorists will be forced to keep to the B-commitments, will they still 
be able to adopt an A-theoretical account for continuity? The discrete growing block, 
on the other hand, is able to preserve all of the elements that seemed contradictory 
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